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Abstract 
This paper shows that the introduction of a conditional collective bonus in an agri-environmental 
scheme (AES) can improve farmers’ participation and increase land enrolment for lower overall 
budgetary costs. This monetary bonus is paid in addition to the usual AES payment if a given threshold 
is reached in terms of aggregate farmer participation. Using a choice experiment, we estimate the 
preferences of wine growers in the South of France for such a bonus. We show that it contributes to 
increased expectations of farmers on others’ participation, therefore shifting a pro-environmental 
social norm and favouring the adoption of less pesticide-intensive farming practices.  




Agri-environmental measures were introduced in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 
1992 to reduce the negative impact of agriculture on the environment. They are individual contracts 
between the government and farmers who volunteer to implement environmentally-enhanced 
management practices in return for an annual payment. The logic behind these measures is that, when 
adopting pro-environmental practices that will benefit to the overall society, farmers bear individual 
costs. The use of monetary incentives is a way to resolve this conflict by making these practices the 
best option for both self and collective-interest. In the European context, payments are calculated so 
as to compensate average compliance costs and foregone farming revenue associated with the 
adoption of less-intensive (more environmentally-benign) farming techniques. Over the 2007-2013 
financial period, total payments made by the European Union for agri-environmental schemes (AES)1 
amounted to 22.7 billion Euros, and were supplemented by Member states by an approximately-
equivalent amount.   
However, the low participation rate of farmers in such schemes and the consequently 
insufficient farming area enrolled in agri-environmental measures (especially those which demand 
greater environmental efforts) are a concern for decision-makers and are pointed out by expert 
reports and research articles as explaining the disappointing environmental outcomes of most 
                                                             
1 Financial plan of EARDF axis 2 measure 214 (agri-environment)  
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European AES (Hanley et al., 1999; Yang et al., 2005; ECA, 2011). Such analysis highlights that the 
effectiveness of AES is often jeopardized by environmental threshold effects which mean that changes 
in farming practices are often ineffective unless they are adopted at a sufficient scale in terms of 
environmental efforts and area enrolled. It is therefore crucial to ensure that the participation rate is 
high enough to enable such thresholds to be attained. Otherwise, the environmental gains from the 
spending of public money are much reduced (Dupraz et al., 2009).  
Agri-environmental schemes in European Member states are regularly revised and adjusted 
in order to improve their cost-efficiency. The French rural development program for the 2007-2013 
period imposed a better targeting on vulnerable areas and introduced contracts proposing two 
different levels of environmental practices – an entry-level and a more demanding contract – matched 
by different levels of financial compensation – in order to better take account of the heterogeneity of 
farmers’ preferences and constraints (Kuhfuss et al., 2012). Despite these adjustments, the 
participation rate to agri-environmental schemes remained low at the time of the Mid-Term review.2 
In a context of tight public money, policy-makers are reluctant to propose an upward adjustment of 
contract payments as a way to attract more farmers into AES.  The context of the CAP reform for the 
2014-2020 period is offering an opportunity to rethink the design of AES in order to improve the rate 
of participation and to increase the total area enrolled in AES without increasing the cost of AES for 
the taxpayer. This is the policy design challenge which our paper addresses. 
Among the possible solutions, the French Ministry of Agriculture is interested in contracts with 
a collective dimension that would encourage the participation of a large number of farmers in target 
areas. This is in line with the European Commission’s proposals to promote and contribute financially 
to the development of cooperative actions by farmers in order to facilitate the transition towards 
more sustainable farming systems and agricultural practices. The collective contract option has 
already been explored and tested in some countries. The most well-known examples are the 
environmental cooperatives in the Netherlands (Franks, 2011; Amblard, 2012) in which members 
agree jointly to sign a contract and decide together how to share environmental efforts and contract 
payments.  Other types of contracts condition payments to a minimum participation rate (Le Coent et 
al., 2014), whilst revisions to the UK’s Higher Level Stewardship also reward group behaviour. 
In this paper, we expand the initial analysis presented in Kuhfuss et al. (2014), which assessed 
the potential of contracts that reward individual participation, but which also offer a bonus payment 
to each enrolled farmer when a target pre-defined in terms of total enrolled area is reached at the 
regional or catchment scale. Our goal is to evaluate, from an empirical perspective and using a stated 
preference approach, whether this type of contract can effectively improve the dynamics of 
enrolment and increase the cost-effectiveness of an AES. Changes to current payment regimes which 
encourage participation and promote collective action have already been studied but with a different 
focus than that used here. One relevant strand of work addresses the specific issue of spatial 
coordination of enrolled plots of land. When fragmented land needs to be reunited under a coherent 
                                                             
2 An analysis implemented by the Rural development Observatory (ODR, INRA) on the basis of data supplied by the Agence 
de Services et de Paiement (Payment and services agency) shows that on average 21% of the targeted areas were enrolled 
in the MAEt scheme in 2012 in France, with a variation ranging from 2% in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, a highly field-crop productive 
region, to 69% in Franche-Comté, a bovine breeding region with a high percentage of grass areas and forests. In Languedoc-




habitat protection policy for example (USDA, 1998), the ‘agglomeration bonus’ pays an extra bonus 
for every plot a landowner enrols that borders another enrolled plot. The efficiency properties of a 
contract proposing an agglomeration bonus have been assessed through lab experiments (Parkhurst 
et al., 2002; Banerjee et al., 2009, 2014). Our focus here is different since we are interested in the way 
such a conditional bonus can boost participation where a trigger point for the bonus is set. Another 
set of research articles have focussed on the tying of incentives for individual actions by farmers to 
reduce pollution run-off from their land to watercourses to the effects of aggregate behaviour, 
through an ambient quality based tax/subsidy scheme (Suter and Vossler, 2013). However, our 
behavioural context is somewhat different from the strategic interactions analysed in these kinds of 
models. Finally, since we discuss farmer actions which contribute towards a public good (higher 
environmental quality) subject to a threshold, the literature on provision point mechanisms is also 
somewhat relevant (Bush et al., 2013). However, the key difference in our work is that we do not focus 
on incentive compatibility problems which exist in terms of eliciting the willingness of farmers to enrol 
in a scheme. 
Our focus on a contract which includes a collective action bonus additionally to an individual 
payment is motivated by two observations. The first one is that farmers are often reluctant to make a 
collective commitment that makes them too dependent on others’ decisions. They might be thought 
to prefer contracts where payments do not rely on the actions of others. The second, which is not 
contradictory with the first observation, is that the dynamics of contracts may be subject to a 
phenomenon similar to the diffusion of innovations (Rogers, 1983), whereby farmers commit more 
easily if they are assured that their neighbours or peers do the same. This effect is documented in a 
number of case studies (Chen et al., 2009; Beharry-Borg et al., 2012). But it is difficult to measure and 
predict. From these two observations, we think that it is important to add a collective dimension (such 
as the collective bonus we propose) to these individual payment schemes to activate other types of 
preferences and, in particular, to take advantage of the effect of social norms.  
This article examines the preferences of winegrowers in the French region of Languedoc-
Roussillon for innovative herbicide-reduction contracts combining an individual payment and a 
conditional final bonus, paid to each participating wine-grower proportionally to his enrolled land, 
provided that a given threshold is attained in terms of total area enrolled in the scheme at the local 
level. In a more general setting, the contribution of this paper is to test a contract design that could 
reduce the risk of under-contribution to a local public good (improved environmental quality) by 
introducing a club good with threshold: in contracts offering a conditional bonus, each enrolled farmer 
increases the likelihood that payments of all other participating farmers increase. His participation in 
the AES can therefore be compared to a contribution to a club good with a contribution threshold.  
To measure the interest and farmers' preferences for contracts combining individual and 
collective incentives, we rely on the choice experiment of Kuhfuss et al. (2014). The choice modelling 
method has been used in several recent studies to better understand the impact of various contract 
designs on adoption rates (for example, Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Christensen et al., 2011; Broch 
and Vedel 2011; Broch et al., 2013). These papers explore the role of different attributes of the scheme 
on farmers’ decision to participate, namely: the intensity of the environmental change, the flexibility 
and length of the contract, the importance of monitoring and modalities of the application process. 
Nevertheless no bonus or any collective dimension has ever been tested as an attribute of the contract 
in this literature. Therefore, one original contribution of the choice experiment considered here is the 
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introduction of two monetary attributes in the choice sets submitted to respondents, namely the 
standard monetary attribute that measures the willingness to accept of farmers for different 
attributes of the agri-environmental contract and the conditional final bonus. The second original 
contribution of this choice experiment, which is the focus of this paper, is that respondents were asked 
to choose not only their preferred contract but also how much of their farm land they would be willing 
to enrol in the chosen contract. The analysis of these additional data gives new insights on the overall 
effect of the bonus of the scheme’s efficiency.  
First results of the choice modelling survey can be found in Kuhfuss et al. (2014) [note that 
this paper is published in French]. The analysis in Kuhfuss et al. is based on responses from 317 wine-
growers in the “Languedoc-Roussillon” region of southern France, concerning hypothetical herbicide-
reduction measures. The authors show that wine growers have a strong preference for a contract with 
a conditional bonus, especially when they are more confident that the participation target that 
triggers the bonus payment can be reached in their area. Starting from this analysis, we confirm the 
positive impact of the bonus on the probability of the farmers engaging in such contracts by estimating 
new models (mixed logit models) which take into account the heterogeneity of farmer’ preferences. 
However, the most important contribution of the present paper is the analysis of the effect of the 
collective bonus on the acreage enrolled by the respondents when they choose a contract. We show 
that the conditional bonus encourages farmers to enrol a larger proportion of their vineyard in the 
agri-environmental scheme. The importance of this result is that the increased land enrolment goes 
beyond the direct financial impact due to an increased expected payment (the bonus). Indeed we 
show with simulations that the area of land enrolled in a contract with a collective bonus is greater 
than the area that would have been engaged had the bonus amount been paid without any collective 
condition, most likely due to the instilling of a social norm effect. We therefore demonstrate that the 
conditional bonus is an effective way to increase the total area enrolled for a given budgetary outlay, 
both by increasing farmers participation and by increasing the area engaged by each participating 
farmers. It thus opens opportunities to develop more cost-effective AES through the wider use of 
collective payment schemes.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the behavioural factors that can explain 
the farmers’ preferences for contracts with conditional bonus. Section 3 presents the estimation 
method and data.  Section 4 contains the results and discussions. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Adoption of agri-environmental measures and collective dynamics 
There is a growing theoretical and empirical economic literature on the reasons why farmers 
choose whether or not to sign an agri-environmental contract (Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Peerlings 
and Polman, 2009; Christensen et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2012). This literature shows that farmers’ 
decisions to join an AES are driven both by technical constraints and expected profit, but also 
highlights the role that behavioural factors can play in farmers’ motivations.  
In a standard economic analysis, it is assumed that the farmer makes his decision based on 
the trade-off between the utility of a contract payment and the expected disutility of the 
environmental effort he has to provide. Empirical studies show that his minimum willingness to accept 
(WTA) when joining an AES depends on the level of restrictions imposed by the agri-environmental 
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contract on farming practices, on socio-economic characteristics which may be correlated with 
preferences, but also on specific attributes of the contract such as the contract duration, the flexibility 
permitted by the menu of authorized management practices, and the perceived transaction costs 
associated with administration and control (Falconer and Saunders, 2002; Ducos et al., 2009; Ruto and 
Garrod, 2009). Based on these findings, recommendations are made to improve the design of 
contracts and to adjust them better to farmers’ preferences and constraints in order to boost 
participation. In this regard, an under-explored area of contract innovation is the collective dimension 
of contracts. Designing a specific incentive to encourage a group of farmers to enrol in an agri-
environmental scheme can engender positive dynamics of change, by accelerating the contract 
adoption rate in a given area. 
There are several reasons why greater participation in an AES can engender in turn a greater 
willingness to participate by those who have earlier decided not to enrol. The first reason lies in the 
public good dimension of the environmental benefits generated by such schemes: in the case of water 
contamination by herbicides (our case study), each farmer’s efforts to reduce pollution contributes to 
improved water quality, which is a public good shared by all residents of the same catchment area. It 
can also be considered a public good with a threshold: if the pesticide concentration exceeds a 
maximum value set by health authorities, then abstracted water must undergo costly treatments 
which are paid for by water users through higher water prices. Therefore total efforts to reduce 
pesticide use must be sufficient to ensure that the threshold is not exceeded. If this is not the case, 
then all efforts are, to a degree, wasted (Ferraro, 2008).   
The second reason why collective payments may induce additional individual participation is 
linked to the cost of herbicide use abatement. Indeed, the individual costs borne by farmers to reduce 
their pollution can depend on the global participation rate in the AES. Are there cost synergies in 
herbicide use abatement? The agriculture literature on this point is unclear. On the one hand, if many 
farmers in the catchment reduce their use of herbicide, we can expect that weeds will prosper and 
the cost of weed control will increase accordingly. On the other hand, if a group of neighbouring 
farmers chooses to adopt similar no-herbicide technologies to control weeds, it is likely that they will 
share experience, and so benefit from mutual learning, and could choose to buy costly equipment 
together. This could clearly contribute to reduce the unit costs of abatement (Waterfield and 
Zilberman, 2012).  
The third reason relates to behavioural factors. A literature in social psychology and 
behavioural economics shows that well-being does not depend simply on our absolute level of 
consumption or wealth but also on how we compare ourselves relative to others, and how we perceive 
our position or rank in the social group to which we belong (Bernheim, 1994; Thaler and Sustein, 2008). 
The choice of an individual can be guided by his desire to receive the same benefits as other members 
of the group or behave like them. In particular, it has been demonstrated that some individuals value 
conforming to a social norm. Social norms are usually sustained by feelings attached to the reputation 
and self-esteem generated by conforming to a common rule or behaviour, or the shame and guilt of 
not conforming. Such norms can play a powerful role in decisions: individual behaviour can be 
influenced by the behaviour of other members in the community and, conversely, a change in 
aggregate behaviour can induce a change in the individual’s behaviour (Dietz, 2002; Pretty, 2003; 
Brekke et al., 2003; Czajkowski et al., 2014). Regarding farmers specifically, Chen et al. (2009) have 
studied the effect of different factors on people’s intentions of re-enrolling in a specific payment for 
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environmental services scheme in China. They find empirically with a choice modelling approach that, 
in addition to conservation payments and program duration, the main driver of stated intentions to 
re-enrol is the information that others in the neighbourhood also intend to re-enrol. In other words, 
an already high level of participation can positively influence the choice of other farmers to 
participate.  
Thus, an action, information or an incentive that changes the perception or expectation that 
an individual has on the social norm can induce them to change their decisions (Benabou and Tirole, 
2012; Collier et al., 2010). This result can be used to ‘nudge’ behaviour by adapting policy design 
(Collier et al., 2010; Duflo et al., 2011; World Bank, 2015), supercharging the effects of economic 
incentives (Videras et al., 2012; Croson and Treich, 2014). Our ‘nudge’ relies on a conditional bonus 
paid to each farmer who has signed a contract, in addition to the contract payment, provided that 
50% of farming land in the area of interest is enrolled in the AES. Of course, at first sight, the 
introduction of such a bonus in a contract is expected to boost the rate of enrolment and acreage 
engaged by each participating farmer by offering an additional financial incentive to contractors. But 
it is also expected to have more subtle positive indirect effects: with such contracts, would-be 
contractors should be more confident that others will join as well and that the overall participation 
rate will be high (Francks, 2011). It can thus trigger a greater desire to participate, associated with the 
three reasons outlined above, even for a lower unconditional individual payment. It is also a way to 
signal that the social norm is to participate to the AES rather than not. Farmers who prefer to behave 
like the rest of the social group might be induced to participate for a lower payment. If their WTA is 
reduced by an amount that is greater than the expected bonus payment, then both the participation 
rate and total area enrolled can be increased without adding to public spending.   
 
3. Estimation method and data 
 
3.1. Choice experiment method  
In order to analyse the impact of the bonus on farmers’ participation and acreage enrolment 
we use a choice experiment survey. In this stated preference survey, farmers are confronted with a 
succession of choice cards, in each of which they are asked to choose between two different 
alternative agri-environmental contracts and a status quo option:  specifically, the possibility to keep 
their present practices. The contracts are described in terms of attributes, each alternative presenting 
different level of these attributes. If the respondent chooses one of the alternative contracts on a 
choice card, rather than the status quo option, he is then asked how much of the acreage of his farm 
he would be willing to enrol in this contract. This two-step procedure is very close to the process of 
choices a farmer is confronted to in ‘real life’ situation. The analysis of the contracts chosen by the 
farmers provides information on how the relative levels of the attributes influence these choices. The 
idea here is to analyse whether the levels of the attributes also have an influence on the acreage that 
farmers wish to enrol.  
3.2. Modelling the decision over how much land to enrol 
First step: the choice of a contract 
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Farmers’ decisions to choose a contract is guided by the relative level of utility he can gain by 
choosing one contract (identified by its k attributes) compared to the alternative contracts available 
and the status quo (no participation in the AES). Each farmer makes T successive choices during the 
survey. According to Lancaster’s theory (1966), this utility is a linear function of the contract’s 
attributes. Following random utility theory, we assume that the utility of farmer n when choosing 
alternative i in a choice card Ct (𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇) (Uint, unobserved) consists of an observable deterministic 
element Vint and a random part εint: 
𝑈𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑡(𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑡 
where Vint depends on the attributes of contract i faced by n, Xint. 
Individual n will choose alternative i in choice card Ct if this alternative procures him the 
highest level of utility of all J alternatives present in this choice card. If Aint is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if alternative i is chosen by farmer n in choice card Ct, then:  
𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑡 = {
1 if 𝑈𝑖𝑛𝑡 > 𝑈𝑗𝑛𝑡 , ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐶𝑡 ,  𝑗 ≠ 𝑖
0 if 𝑈𝑖𝑛𝑡 ≤ 𝑈𝑗𝑛𝑡 , ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐶𝑡 ,  𝑗 ≠ 𝑖
 
with the assumption that the unobservable error terms εint are independently and identically 
distributed (IID) among the alternatives and across the population and follow a Gumbel distribution, 
then the probability that farmer n chooses alternative i in the choice card Ct is:
   
 




with 𝛽 the vector of k preference parameters, representing the average ‘weight’ of each 
attribute of the contract on farmers’ preferences.  This is the Conditional Logit model. 
The use of Conditional Logit model supposes that Irrelevant Alternatives are Independent 
(hypothesis of IIA), which is a strong assumption. The mixed logit model relaxes this assumption. Using 
this specification, the parameters 𝛽𝑘𝑛 are specific to each individual and randomly distributed across 
the population, with a density function 𝑓(𝛽𝑘). Then, conditional on vector 𝛽𝑛 the probability that 
farmer n chooses alternative i in choice card Ct is:  




The probability of observing the sequence of T choices by individual n is:  







where 𝑓(𝛽) can be specified to be normal or lognormal: 𝛽~𝑁(𝑏, 𝜎) or ln 𝛽 ~𝑁(𝑏, 𝜎). The 
parameters b and σ are respectively the mean and the covariance of these distributions and are to be 
estimated by simulation (Train, 2009). 
Second step: the choice of acreage 
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Once the respondent n has chosen one of the alternative contracts in a choice card 𝐶𝑡, he is 
asked what acreage of his farm he would enrol in such a contract. Then, the acreage yint enrolled by 
farmer n in contract i is only observed for selected (non-status-quo) alternatives, i.e. if 𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1, and 
can be expressed as: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑛𝑡𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 (1) 
The acreage enrolled, yint, depends on the characteristics of the alternative contract Aint, and 
on the individual characteristics of farmer n and his farm, all included in vector Zint. The yint choices 
also depends on unobservable factors, 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡. The regression function on the sub-sample of selected 
alternatives is:  
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡|𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1) = 𝑍𝑖𝑛𝑡𝛼 + 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡|𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1) 
with 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡|𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1) = 0 if 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 are independent. It is possible that the unobserved 
factors affecting farmer’s choice of a contract, 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑡, are correlated with the unobserved factors that 
will influence his choice of acreage, 𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡. Then, 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡|𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1) ≠ 0 and this selection bias needs to 
be corrected. We use two different methods: first we use a fixed effect specification for the regression 
model and then we use a two-step procedure. 
The random term in equation (1) can be considered as being composed of two parts:  
𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝜃𝑛 + 𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑡  
𝜃𝑛 contains the individual time-invariant unobserved factors of farmer’s acreage choice, while 
𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑡  reflects the remaining source of variation in acreage enrolment. A fixed effect specification of the 
regression eliminates 𝜃𝑛 from the equation, which can be re-written as:  
?̈?𝑖𝑛𝑡 = ?̈?𝑖𝑛𝑡𝛼 + ?̈?𝑖𝑛𝑡 
with ?̈?𝑖𝑛𝑡 , ?̈?𝑖𝑛𝑡 and ?̈?𝑖𝑛𝑡the time-demeaned variables (?̈?𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡 − ?̅?𝑛). 
Under the assumption that 𝐸(?̈?𝑖𝑛𝑡|𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1) = 0, α can be estimated consistently using OLS 
on this last equation.  
Another way of dealing with this bias is to use a two-step procedure as this problem is very 
close to the selection bias addressed by Heckman’s procedure (Heckman, 1979). This procedure has 
been implemented to correct for selection bias in the analysis of factors influencing farmers’ 
participation and choice of acreage based on real participation data in AES (Chang and Boisvert, 2009, 
Giovanopoulou et al., 2011). However, we need to account for the specificities of our data, where the 
first step (selection) is a choice between many alternatives that cannot be modelled with a probit but 
requires the use of a conditional logit model or a mixed logit.  
Söderberg and Barton (2014) use Lee’s correction method (1983) to account for selection bias 
in a contingent valuation study. This method has been compared to two other methods by 
Bourguignon et al. (2007) to address the issue of selection bias correction based on multinomial logit 
models. Depending on the method, the selection bias is corrected through the introduction of 
different additional terms in the regression, that are functions of the predicted probabilities of choice 
of each alternative, 𝑃(𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1) = 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡, estimated in a first step through a multinomial logit model. 
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The authors show through Monte Carlo simulations that an extension of Dubin and McFadden (1984)’s 
specification performs better. The first step of this procedure, the MNL, relies on the same assumption 
as mixed logit, that 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑡 are independent and identically Gumbel distributed. They show that under 
this assumption, the parameters α from the outcome equation (acreage enrolled in our case) can be 
estimated by least squares on the basis of:   








] + 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑡 
where σ is the standard deviation uint, rit (respectively rjt) is a correlation coefficient between 
uint and ԑint and finally wint is a residual, mean-independent from the regressors. As Zint, Wint includes 
the characteristics of the alternative contract Aint of the choice card Ct and the individual 
characteristics of farmer n and his farm. The difference between these two vectors is that at least one 
of the variables included in Xint in the selection equation (choice of a contract) is not included in Wint. 
In our case farmers choose between alternatives A1, A2 and A3 in each choice card, A3 being 
the status quo. Let us define, A1 as the chosen alternative and m1, m2, m3,  µ1, µ2 and µ3 as:  
𝑚1 = −𝑙𝑛(𝑃1),     𝑚2 = 𝑃2
𝑙𝑛(𝑃2)
1−𝑃2
 ,  𝑚3 = 𝑃3
𝑙𝑛(𝑃3)
1−𝑃3
 ,   𝜇1 =  𝜎
√6
𝜋
𝑟1,     𝜇2 =  𝜎
√6
𝜋





With A1=1 the regression equation becomes: 
𝑦1𝑛𝑡 = 𝑍1𝑛𝑡𝛼 + 𝑚1𝜇1 + 𝑚2𝜇2 + 𝑚3𝜇3 + 𝑤1𝑛𝑡 
By including m1, m2 and m3 in the regression, consistent estimators of α, µ1, µ2 and µ3 can be 
obtained by least squares.  
To summarise the second procedure, we first estimate 𝛽𝑛with a mixed logit, estimate the 
predicted probabilities 𝑃(𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1), then, we use these probabilities to control for selection bias in 
the acreage regression and obtain estimates for α. 
 
3.3. Data 
Our evaluation is conducted in the Languedoc-Roussillon region, located in the South East of 
France, where nearly two thirds of the agricultural area is dedicated to vineyards. The widespread use 
of chemical herbicides to control weeds has contributed to the contamination of groundwater and 
streams. French authorities have identified 38 watersheds in Languedoc-Roussillon which may 
represent a sanitary risk for drinking water and for which policy solutions must be found to reduce 
agricultural diffuse pollution. The main policy option is to induce farmers to switch to more 
environmentally-friendly weed control techniques such as mechanical weeding or controlled grass 
cover. France is thus re-examining the design of its AES in order to enrol larger vineyard areas in low-
herbicide practices.  
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As mentioned before, the data were collected through a choice experiment survey in which 
farmers were invited to select their best option between two different contracts and a ‘status quo’ 
alternative (Figure 1). If they chose one of the two contracts proposed, they were then asked how 
much land (in ha) they would be prepared to enrol in the selected contract. In our survey setting, the 
conditional bonus is paid at the end of the five-year contracting period. This choice was made for two 
reasons: first, it can be difficult to reach the target area (50% of the farming area in the zone of 
interest) in only one year and, second, because it gives enough time for diffusion and social norm 
effects. In particular, enrolling farmers can encourage fellow farmers to participate in order to increase 
the likelihood of reaching the target.   
The attributes of the contract and their levels (Table 1) were chosen with the technical help 
of the four local farm union-run bodies called ‘Chambres Départementales d’Agriculture’. The 
questionnaire was discussed with two focus groups made of winegrowers and was then partially 
redesigned. A pilot survey was conducted with 31 face to face interviews with winegrowers.  
Table 1: Attributes and attribute levels chosen for the choice experiment  
Attribute Description Levels 
Reduction of herbicide use 
during the contract  
Global reduction of herbicide use on 
the enrolled area (in proportion of 
present use) 
Quantitative variable: 
-30% ; -60% ; -100%  
Localized use of herbicides  Supplementary localized use of 
herbicides beyond the committed 
reduction 
Dummy variable:  
Allowed (reference) ; 
Forbidden  
Collective and final conditional 
bonus 
150€/ha after five years, provided 
that, at the end of the 5 years, 50% of 
the area of interest is engaged in a 
process of herbicide use reduction  
Dummy variable:  
Final bonus (150€/ha 
equivalent to 30 €/ha/year) ; 
No bonus (ref.) 
Administrative and technical 
assistance  
Free administrative and technical 
assistance  included in the contract 
and provided by a local  technician  
Dummy variable:  
Yes ; No (ref.) 
Individual annual payment per 
enrolled hectare 
Payment received each year by the 
winegrower per enrolled hectare 
Quantitative variable: 90€/ha ; 
170€/ha ; 250€/ha ; 330€/ha ; 
410€/ha ; 500€/ha 
 
Two attributes concern herbicide use in the engaged plots. The first one is the overall 
reduction in herbicide use as a proportion of present use on the enrolled lands. Alternative practices 
to herbicides being more costly, we expect that the propensity of farmers to choose a contract will 
decrease as the constraint on herbicide use increases. The second one introduces flexibility in the 
contract by allowing or not the possibility to spread locally herbicides above the contractual limit 
defined by the first attribute, as long as this doesn’t represent more than 10% of the engaged area. 
This practice is common among vine growers and facilitates the control of residual weeds. If this 
practice were to be forbidden in the contract it would likely decrease farmers’ willingness to 
participate in the AES. Administrative burden is frequently mentioned as an important obstacle to 
farmers’ participation in AESs, therefore, the introduction of free administrative and technical 
assistance – the fourth attribute- should facilitate farmers’ participation. The payment attribute is an 
annual and per hectare individual payment. The amounts vary between 90 and 500 €/ha/year, and an 
increase in the payment offered is expected to have a positive effect on farmers’ choice of a contract. 
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The present scheme for herbicide use reduction in the region proposes payments that vary from 141 
€/ha for a reduction in herbicide use by 40% of the regional standard to 350 €/ha for a conversion to 
organic vine growing.  
Finally, the main attribute of interest for the current paper is the bonus. This additional 
payment is conditional on reaching an overall participation rate in term of acreage (50% of the local 
vineyard) and would be paid per enrolled hectare to each participating farmer at the end of the 5 year 
contract. It is meant to favour higher participation rates and land enrolment by providing an additional 
incentive, but also by signalling the social norm of herbicide reduction.  
A full factorial design (all possible combinations of attribute levels) would have represented 
20,592 choice cards. Thus an efficient design was selected (by an initial estimation of parameters from 
the responses obtained in the pilot survey) composed of 3 blocks of 6 choice cards. An example of 
choice card is presented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Example of choice card 
The data were collected using an online, e-mail distributed survey sent to 3100 winegrowers 
in Languedoc-Roussillon with the help of the Chambres Départementales d’Agriculture of the four 
wine making Departments of the region (Aude, Gard, Hérault and Pyrénées-Orientales). 317 farmers 
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answered the survey (a response rate of 10.2%), each answering to 6 successive choice cards. They 
also answered questions on their present herbicide use practices and on their socio-economic 
characteristics. Follow-up questions included a specific question on the attainability of the threshold. 
It was phrased as follows: ‘Do you believe that the 50% threshold of AES-enrolled land in your area 
can be reached?’ It was used in our analysis as a proxy of farmers’ beliefs that the bonus will be paid. 
69% of our sample believed that this threshold could be reached. 
Our sample is slightly biased because of the use on an on-line survey. Indeed, the comparison 
of the characteristics of our sample to these of Languedoc-Roussillon winegrowers (data from the 
French farm census 2010) shows that our sample is representative of the population who has an 
internet access, but not of the whole population. Women, older (more than 65 years old), lower 
educated winegrowers and smaller farms belonging to a cooperative winery are under-represented. 
We will keep in mind this sampling bias during the analysis of the results.  
In all, 71 (22%) of the 317 respondents always prefer not to subscribe a contract, i.e. they 
choose the opt-out option in the 6 choice situations. The systematic choice of the status quo may hide 
protest responses, even if choice experiment methods are expected to be less prone to this bias than 
contingent valuation methods (Hanley et al., 2001). In order to identify potential protest respondents, 
we used a debriefing question. Each time a respondent selected the ‘status quo’ option, he was given 
the opportunity to explain his decision. He could explain his rejection of the two proposed alternatives 
by ticking one of the following options:  
 The financial compensations are  too low (1) 
 The required level of herbicide reduction is too constraining for my farm (2) 
 I do not  want to be constrained in my farming practices, regardless of the compensation 
awarded (3) 
 Other : ______________________ 
Among the 71 farmers who always preferred not to sign a contract, 27 systematically chose 
the third explanation. We identify these 27 wine growers as protest respondents since they reject the 
contract whatever the associated financial compensation. When analysing the follow-up questions 
included in the survey, we noted that those respondents were significantly less convinced by the 
impact that such agri-environmental contract can have on water quality improvement and on the 
conversion of farmers to more environmentally-friendly practices (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests). 
Therefore, as it is commonly done in the literature, we removed those 27 protest respondents from 
the sample (Adamowicz et al., 1998; Barrio and Loureiro, 2010). Thus, the following results are 
obtained with a reduced sample of 290 respondents. 
 
4. Results 
First, we analyse the determinants of farmers’ willingness to enrol. Second, we present the 
results on the decision acreage enrolment when a contract is chosen. Finally, we discuss the overall 
effect of the bonus. 
4.1. Analysis of participation 
 13 
 
The Conditional Logit model gives a first estimation of the average effects of contract 
attributes on farmers’ choice (𝛽). This first model (see CL in Table 2) only contains the attributes of 
the contract as a factor of choice. The Hausman test shows that the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) hypothesis is violated in our sample, making conditional logit estimators invalid. 
Thus, in Table 2, we also present the results of two mixed logit estimations. In both Mixed Logit models 
(ML1 and ML2) we assume a normal distribution of the beta parameters of all the attributes except 
for the payment attribute, for which a lognormal distribution is specified. The first mixed logit model 
(ML1) only contains the attributes of the contract as a factor of choice as a comparison with the 
conditional logit model (CL). In the second mixed logit model (ML2), we introduce three individual 
characteristics of the respondents and their farm in interaction with the Alternative Specific Constant 
(ASC). Farmers’ characteristics can thus influence farmers’ willingness to adopt an AES, rather than 
staying at their status quo. These individual characteristics need to be introduced in interaction with 
the ASC as they are invariant through the choices of a respondent. These characteristics are: their 
present use of herbicides (IFT) and the total area of their vineyard. The third farmers’ characteristic 
included is the confidence that respondents declare to have in the possibility that the threshold can 
be reached. Indeed, the particularity of the collective bonus is that it is paid only if 50% of the zone of 
interest is enrolled in the AES. Threshold Confidence is coded as a dummy variable: Threshold 
Confidence = 0 if farmers believe that the threshold cannot be reached, Threshold Confidence = 1 if 
farmers believe that this threshold can be reached.  
The results of the first mixed logit model (ML1, Table 2) are significant and match our 
hypothesis: the more constraining the contracts are, the less attractive they are to farmers. Indeed, 
winegrowers as a whole are reluctant to reduce their use of herbicides and to be forbidden localized 
chemical weed control. Introducing a bonus or free technical and administrative assistance in the 
contract has a positive influence on their probability to participate in the AES. The positive value of 
the ASC shows that farmers prefer to choose one of the contracts proposed rather than their status 
quo. Finally, as expected, the payment influences positively the probability of choosing the contract. 
The standard deviation coefficients, presented in the lower part of Table 2, also reveal that 
preferences for all the attributes, excepted for the bonus, are heterogeneous among the farmers of 
our sample. This is consistent with previous work (Kuhfuss et al., 2014) analysing preference 
heterogeneity through a latent class model. Thus, ML2 completes this analysis by showing that 
trusting that the threshold will be reached is an important driver of contract adoption.  
 14 
 
Table 2: Conditional Logit model and Mixed Logit estimations  
 
Conditional Logit CL  Mixed Logit ML1 Mixed Logit ML2 
N = 290 N = 290 N = 254a 
Depend. Var. : Choice β St. error β St. error β St. error 
Mean       
ASC 0.285* 0.158 3.105*** 0.364 0.486 0.696 
Herbicides reduction -0.025*** 0.002 -0.077*** 0.007 -0.070*** 0.006 
Herbicides : no localized use  -0.523*** 0.075 -1.172*** 0.139 -1.182*** 0.143 
Bonus 0.444*** 0.074 0.648*** 0.110 0.555*** 0.117 
Free assistance 0.174** 0.086 0.521*** 0.160 0.436** 0.184 
Payment 0.003*** 0.3x10-3 0.005*** <0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 
IFT * ASC  - - - - 0.093 0.428 
Threshold Confidence * ASC - - - - 3.597*** 0.501 
Total vineyard area * ASC  - - - - -0.004 0.008 
Standard Deviation       
ASC - - 2.826*** 0.286 1.039*** 0.358 
Herbicides reduction - - 0.069*** 0.007 0.048*** 0.006 
Herbicides : no localized use  - - 0.719*** 0.220 0.429* 0.243 
Bonus - - 0.144 0.209 0.329 0.287 
Free assistance - - 1.106*** 0.233 1.751*** 0.269 
Payment  - - 0.008*** 0.002 0.007*** 0.001 
IFT * ASC  - - - - 0.997*** 0.285 
Threshold Confidence * ASC - - - - 2.321*** 0.339 
Total vineyard area * ASC  - - - - 0.014** 0.006 
Number of observations 
LR chi2 
Prob > chi2 

















Significant levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
a Some respondents did not answer all the questions, so there are few missing data on some variables in ML2 
At this point, our first main result concerning the influence of collective incentives on farmers’ 
preferences is that the introduction of the bonus does have a significant and positive influence on 
farmers’ decision to choose an AE contract. Additionally, farmers who believe that the threshold can 
be reached, i.e. that more than 50% of the local vineyard will be enrolled in such a contract, are more 
likely to participate, but the two other individual characteristics have no significant impact on farmers’ 
decision to participate. We believe that this bonus acts like a nudge. That is, by focussing respondents’ 
attention on the fact that others are more likely to participate, the bonus influences farmer’s choices. 
In addition from results in Table 2, the willingness to accept3 a contract with a final conditional bonus 
is 138€ less per hectare and per year with ML1 (108€ with ML2) than the same contract without bonus, 
which is much higher than the expected monetary value of the bonus which cannot be more than 30 
€/ha/year. Thus, the introduction of a bonus in the AES could not only increase participation, but also 
reduce the cost of the AES to the government.  
                                                             
3 The willingness to accept of farmers for each attribute (by comparison with the reference level, see table 1) can be 
estimated with the Conditional Logit and Mixed Logit estimators by dividing the value of the parameter estimated for the 
attribute by the value of the parameter for the payment attribute.  
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We now estimate the impact of this bonus, as well as the impact of the other attributes on 
the area that farmers are willing to enrol in the AES. 
4.2. Analysis of acreage  
As seen in the second step of section 3.2, each time the respondent choses one of the two 
contracts proposed, he had to indicate how much of his farmland (in ha) he would be willing to enrol 
in the chosen contract. This additional information allows us to analyse the proportion of farmland 
enrolled for each type of contract. The proportion of farmland enrolled might depend on farm and 
farmer characteristics, but here we will limit our investigation to the impact of the contract attributes. 
However we propose different estimation models to account for the specificities of our data. 
Among the choices of the 290 farmers, 1022 alternatives other than the status quo were 
chosen and 971 values of areas were completed by 239 farmers (51 values are missing). On average, 
these farmers would enrol 79% of their farmland in the chosen contract, with a minimum value of 
4.5%. Most of the time (54% of the observations) the whole vineyard would be enrolled when a 
contract is chosen, but it is also quite frequent that only a part of the vineyard would be enrolled (0 < 
y < 1).  
We first assume that the reasons why a farmer might be willing to engage his whole farm area 
might be different from the reasons why he would enrol only a proportion of his farmland. To take 
into account these two separate processes, we use a One Inflated Beta regression (Cook et al., 2008). 
Its density function g is defined as:  
𝑔(𝑦;  𝜋, 𝜇, 𝜑) = {
(1 − 𝜋)𝑓(𝑦; 𝜇, 𝜑), 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 < 1
𝜋,                               𝑖𝑓 𝑦 = 1
 
where f is a Beta distribution with parameters µ (mean) and φ (precision parameter) and π is 
a parameter that accounts for the probability of observations at one. Therefore, the One Inflated Beta 
regression fits by maximum likelihood a beta distribution to the distribution of the variable y when y 
< 1 and estimates with a logit model the probability of having the value 1 as two separate processes.   
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Table 3: One Inflated Beta model estimation  
Depend. Var. : % of total vineyard area (y)   
 Coef. St. error 
Proportion (0 < y < 1) (n=443)   
Herbicides reduction -0.005*** 0.002 
Herbicides : no localized use  -0.066 0.083 
Bonus 0.188* 0.098 
Free assistance -0.019 0.100 
Payment (in k€) 0.906*** 0.287 
Intercept 0.067 0.174 
One Inflate (y = 1) (n= 528)   
Herbicides reduction 0.007*** 0.003 
Herbicides : no localized use  -0.285* 0.157 
Bonus 0.042 0.134 
Free assistance -0.125 0.166 
Payment (in k€) 0.418 0.566 
Intercept -0.194 0.298 
Ln_phi Intercept 1.370*** 0.126 
N 971 
Significant levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
In contrast to the results of Table 2, where all the attributes of the contract have a significant 
impact on the probability to enrol, Table 3 shows that not all the attributes have a significant impact 
on the proportion of the vineyard area enrolled. In particular, the attribute ‘free assistance’ seems to 
have no significant impact on the acreage decision, but only on whether to enrol or not.  
The first part of Table 3 presents the estimations on the 443 observations of partial 
commitment of farmers’ vineyard (0 < y < 1). These estimations show that, as we could expect, when 
the contracts become more restrictive in terms of herbicides use, or when payments are lower, 
farmers enrol a smaller share of their vineyard. The bonus also tends to increase the proportion of 
vineyard enrolled (almost significant at the level of 5%, p = 0.054). We can see two explanations to 
this result: when the bonus is proposed, a larger area enrolled increases the chances that the threshold 
be reached. The second explanation is that farmers have higher expected revenue and, as seen with 
the sign of the payment parameter, this has a positive effect on the proportion of vineyard enrolled.   
The second part of Table 3 presents the estimations on the 528 observations when farmers 
declare to be willing to enrol their whole vineyard (y = 1). The results are quite different from those 
obtained when only a proportion is enrolled. Indeed, here, the more restrictive the herbicides use 
reduction, the more likely farmers are to sign in their whole vineyard. This surprising result is 
nevertheless consistent with the fact that completely renouncing the use of herbicides requires an 
investment in equipment for mechanical weeding that is only worthwhile if used on the whole farm. 
Furthermore, we can see that if the flexibility to use herbicides in specific problem areas is not offered, 
farmers are less likely to engage their whole vineyard. This flexibility is therefore important to induce 
farmers to enrol their whole vineyard area.  
Table 4 presents the results obtained with three different estimation models taking into 
account the potential selection bias in our acreage data (see section 3.2). In model 1, the selection 
bias issue is eliminated by estimating a panel model with fixed effects. In model 2 and 3, the estimation 
relies on a 2-step method. As explained in section 3.2, mixed logit estimators (ML1 Table 2) are used 
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to predict the probabilities for each contract of being selected. These probabilities are then used to 
control for the selection bias through 3 correction variables (m1, m2, m3, corresponding to the 3 
independent alternatives of the choice cards) introduced in the equation of interest (acreage). As in 
the two parts of the OIB estimation (Table 3), the variable ‘free assistance’ does not have any 
significant impact on acreage in model 1. This is consistent with the idea that free assistance reduces 
the fixed costs of participation (e.g. administrative burden of and learning alternative weeding 
practices) which do not vary with the acreage enrolled. This result enables us to use this attribute as 
an instrumental variable in the selection equation and thus to remove it from the equation of interest 
in model 2 and in model 3. Model 3 takes also into account the panel structure of our data. 
Table 4: Estimations accounting for a potential selection bias 
Acreage 
(% of total vineyard) 
(1) 
Panel regression with 
fixed effects 
(2) 
OLS regression  
+ bias correction 
(3) 
Panel regression with 
random effects 
+ bias correction 
 α St. error α, 𝜇𝑘  
Bootstrap 
St. error α, 𝜇𝑘  
Bootstrap 
St. error 
Herbicides reduction  - 0.001*** 0.2x10-3 - 0.002* 0.001 - 0.001 0.001 
Herbicides : no localized use - 0.007 0.009 - 0.096*** 0.034 - 0.027 0.019 
Bonus 0.006 0.009 0.058** 0.027 0.022* 0.012 
Free assistance 0.3x10-3 0.011     
Payment  0.1x10-3** 0.03x10-3 0.3x10-3*** 0.1x10-3 0.1x10-3** 0.1x10-3 
_m1    0.070 0.069 0.051 0.031 
_m2    -0.035 0.176 0.028 0.054 
_m3    -0.372 0.248 0.021 0.112 
_cons 0.795*** 0.017 0.501*** 0.176 0.751*** 0.075 
N 971 971 971 
Significant levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
The results of Table 4 show that a stronger reduction in herbicides would significantly 
decrease the proportion of farmland enrolled only in model 1. The lack of robustness of this attribute 
on the acreage enrolled probably comes from the fact that farmers tend to commit their whole 
vineyard when the reduction in herbicides is very high which requires large investments (see Table 3). 
All the model estimations confirm that the payment would have a significant positive effect on the 
acreage. However, forbidding localized use of herbicide has a negative significant impact on acreage 
only in model 2. The bonus has a significant positive effect on enrolled acreage (at 5% in model 2, 10% 
in model 3 but not in model 1). This result is important since not only does the bonus have a significant, 
positive impact on participation and would thus lead new farmers to enter the AES, but it also 
encourages participants to increase their commitment in enrolling a larger proportion of their 
vineyard. These results comfort our intuition that the introduction of a collective performance 
dimension in AES such as this conditional bonus can efficiently increase the total area enrolled. Finally, 
we can highlight that the estimated coefficients for the correction parameters are not significantly 





Since we have seen that an increase in the individual payments would lead to an increase in 
participation and acreage enrolled, it is important to discuss how much the estimated effect of the 
bonus relies on a simple “monetary” effect due to an increase in the payment offered.  
One way of illustrating the effect of the bonus on farmers’ participation and acreage 
enrolment is to compare two measures which propose the same overall payment when the 
participation threshold is reached. The bonus is equivalent to a payment of 30€/ha/year. Of course, 
the expected value of the conditional bonus is less than 30€/ha/year since the bonus is conditional 
and is paid only at the end of the 5 years contract. Therefore, by comparing the bonus to a 30€/ha 
increase in the payment, we measure the minimum additional effect of the bonus on behaviour above 
and beyond its financial impact. Thus we first simulate the total area that is expected to be enrolled 
in a measure proposing a fixed individual payment of 270€/ha/year and no bonus. We then compare 
the impacts of: first, an increase by 30€/ha/year in the payment, and, second, the introduction of the 
bonus. We can compare the effects of an increase of the payment by 30€/ha to the effect of the bonus. 
The other attributes of the measures are set as follows: the objective of herbicides use is a reduction 
by 60%, localized chemical weeding is forbidden and no free assistance is offered. Therefore we 
compare the following three measures (Table 5):  
Table 5: Characteristics of the measures compared in the simulations 
 Reference Measure 1 Measure 2 
Herbicides reduction 60 % 60 % 60 % 
Herbicides : localized use No No No 
Bonus (conditional) No No 30 €/ha/year 
Free assistance No No No 
Payment 270 €/ha/year 300 €/ha/year 270 €/ha/year 
 
Using the results obtained with the Mixed Logit model 1 (ML1, Table 2), we simulate the 
individual probabilities of adoption for the three measures. On average, farmers have a probability of 
adopting the reference measure (270€/ha) of 36.9% (Standard Deviation: 41.5 %). The effect of an 
increase in the payment is illustrated by the adoption rate of Measure 1 (300€/ha but no bonus) which 
is of 37.7% (SD: 41.7%). The introduction of the bonus (Measure 2) leads to an average adoption rate 
of 41% (SD: 42.3%). We can therefore demonstrate that the increase in the probability of participation 
due to the bonus is higher that the pure monetary effect of a 30€/ha increase in the payment.  
Then, using the results of the OLS estimation of the acreage enrolled (model 2 in Table 4), we 
can simulate the percentage of total vineyard that each respondent would be willing to enrol in the 
scheme. Applying this percentage to the actual size of each farmer’s vineyard, we obtain the area that 
each farmer would enrol in the proposed measure. Using the individual probabilities of participation 
previously estimated, we obtain the expected area enrolled in the scheme for the two measures.  
Over the cumulated 7077 hectares of respondents, the total area that could be expected to 
be enrolled in the reference measure is 892.8 hectares (around 12%). With Measure 1, this area would 
increase to 937.4 hectares, whereas the introduction of the bonus in Measure 2 would lead to a total 
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enrolment of 1158.5 hectares (16% of total area)4. Therefore, 44.6 extra hectares would be engaged 
with an increased payment of 30€/ha/year, while 265.7 additional hectares of vineyard would be 
engaged by the introduction of the 30 euros/hectare/year bonus, conditional on the overall 
participation rate. These extra 221 hectares enrolled can be interpreted as the outcome of the 
“nudge” effect of the bonus.   
A final point of discussion concerns the definition of the bonus. Here, the bonus is conditioned 
to an enrolled acreage and not to a number of participants, which could have been expected as the 
bonus aims at signalling the social norm. Though, from an environmental perspective it is desirable to 
reach a large area enrolled in the scheme. Defining the threshold in terms of acreage encourages each 
participating farmer to enrol a larger acreage in order to increase the probability of reaching the 
threshold. This impact of the bonus could have not been obtained if the threshold would have been 
defined in term of number of farmers. From a social norms perspective, it is difficult to say what would 
be the consequence of defining the bonus threshold in terms of number of farmers instead of acreage, 
especially when the size of the farms are very heterogeneous, which is not the case in our sample. In 
this case, if one or a small number of farmers can reach the threshold, the impact of the bonus might 
depend a lot on the way the large farmers are perceived by the other small farmers. We could think 
that larger farmers have more influence on others than smaller ones. Large farmers can be seen as 
leaders to follow (or not). Nevertheless, this interesting question cannot be answered from the 
responses obtained through our choice experiment. 
 
5. Conclusion 
One of the policy questions addressed in the wake of the recent CAP reform is to find ways of 
promoting a wider and more effective participation of farmers in agri-environmental schemes without 
increasing budgetary expenditures. Results obtained in our choice experiment conducted with 
winegrowers in Languedoc Roussillon show that the introduction of a collective dimension to agri-
environmental contracts could effectively enhance such schemes’ efficiency in three ways. First, it 
would enhance farmers’ initial participation. Indeed, our conditional bonus attribute is highly 
significant in explaining the enrolment of respondents into an agri-environmental contract. In 
addition, farmers’ minimum willingness to accept is lowered when the bonus is proposed in the 
contract, by an amount which is greater than the bonus value. Therefore, even if a bonus has to be 
paid to each farmer who has signed a contract (because the threshold has been reached), the cost of 
the scheme per hectare is reduced. Finally, we have found that the collective bonus does encourage 
farmers to enrol a larger share of their vineyard in the scheme.  
The main contribution of this paper, compared to the analysis conducted in Kuhfuss et al. 
(2014) which focuses on the heterogeneity of farmers’ preferences, is the analysis of the acreage 
enrolment decision. This new variable led us to consider two-step decision econometric models: first 
the decision to participate or not in AES, and second the decision over the enrolled acreage when a 
contract is selected. Nevertheless, the acreage data collected in this choice experiment present 
several specificities. First, we had panel data since each respondent faces 6 choice cards. Second, we 
had to take into account a potential selection bias since we observe the acreage variable only if a 
                                                             
4 We can note that such percentage indicates that the bonus would not be paid since the 50% participation rate in 
terms of area enrolled are not attained, at least at the aggregate level.  
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contract is chosen. Third, the selection equation could not rely on a probit model but had to be 
specified as a conditional or mixed logit model. Indeed, the respondents had first to choose an 
alternative among two hypothetical contracts and a status quo.  
Beyond the impact of the bonus on the participation rate and acreage enrolment, our study 
contributes to the analysis of farmers’ behaviour towards collective dimensions of herbicides 
reduction contracts for local water quality. Respondents value the inclusion of the collective bonus 
option in the contract (from 108 to 138€/ha/year) more than its financial magnitude (30€/ha/year). 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that farmers are more willing to provide environmental efforts 
when their neighbours also do so. One interpretation is that farmers want to make sure that their 
efforts do have a significant impact on water quality, an impact that cannot be reached unless most 
famers also participate. Another interpretation is their willingness to choose the practice which is used 
by most of their neighbours. However, our experimental design means that we cannot parse precisely 
between monetary and non-monetary effects of the bonus. This collective bonus appears to be a tool 
that could encourage the emergence of a new social norm influencing winegrowers’ behaviour 
towards pro-environmental practices, but more work is needed to provide more precise insights here. 
It is also encouraging to note that although we thought that a payment threshold of 50% being 
enrolled of the area was quite challenging, a majority of respondents (69%) believed that this 
threshold could be reached. Moreover, our mixed logit results show that, in contrast to all the other 
attributes included in this choice experiment, the preferences for the bonus appear quite homogenous 
among the farmers of our sample.  
To conclude, we think that the CAP policy might benefit from implementing new contract 
designs which include collective dimensions. Beyond agri-environmental contracts, we believe that 
this type of incentive based on a collective achievement could alleviate the participation constraint 
and could offer an effective tool to resolve or reduce other environmental conflicts. Indeed, a 
collective bonus can increase cooperation by indicating the “good action” that should be taken and/or 
by raising the social expectations about this action. It signals the injunctive norm (pro-environmental 
action to be taken) and might strengthen the descriptive norm, or at least beliefs about descriptive 
norms, with a crowding –in effect with respect to the unconditional monetary incentive.  For example, 
a collective bonus could be used by a local council to boost waste recycling. Each inhabitant could be 
promised a tax refund proportional to the volume of recyclable waste that he/she has brought to a 
recycling centre if the total collected waste in the community reaches the volume that makes this 
centre profitable. A collective bonus could be used also to nudge people to switch to public transport. 
For example, climate change-aware companies often propose to employees a financial compensation 
when they choose to take public transport to travel to work. An extra refund (bonus) could be paid to 
each employee using public transports if a participation threshold is reached in the company. This 
bonus, signalling the social norm, could nudge additional employees to join the scheme with greater 
cost-effectiveness than a simple increase in compensation payments. We believe indeed that this kind 
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